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SHIFTING THE BURDEN ON PAY-FOR-DELAY 
CHALLENGES: ANALYZING AB 824’S 
EFFECTS ON REVERSE PAYMENT 
SETTLEMENTS AND DRUG COSTS 
Kevin Wallentine*
Antitrust scholars and agencies have recognized the 
anticompetitive impact of reverse payment settlements—in which 
branded and generic drug companies settle patent disputes, typically by 
delaying the entry of generics into the market. Despite clear competition 
concerns, these settlements are typically subject to a rule of reason 
analysis that puts the burden on enforcers and plaintiffs to prove their 
anticompetitive harms. Recent California legislation—AB 824—shifts 
the burden to the settling drug companies to prove their arrangement is 
not anticompetitive. AB 824 presents an opportunity for advocates of 
lower drug costs but still faces hurdles and shortfalls. This Note examines 
the efficacy of the legislation, the likelihood of it surviving pending 
constitutional challenges, and how it fits into broader efforts at lowering 
drug costs for consumers. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A branded drug company charges consumers monopoly prices for 
its patented drug, enabled by a federal law that creates patent 
exclusivity for a defined period of time. Spurred by other federal 
legislation that permits the entry of generic competitors, a generic drug 
company plans to enter the market. Concerned about the threat to its 
monopoly power, the branded company sues the generic company for 
infringement. Before reaching trial, the parties reach an agreement in 
which the branded company will compensate the generic company to 
keep its drug off the market. The branded company benefits from the 
extension of its monopoly power, the generic company benefits from 
the compensation provided by the settlement, and patients continue to 
pay a premium. 
This scenario looks like a classic restraint of trade, but is there 
antitrust liability for these companies? Between 2005 and 2013, many 
courts found no antitrust violations in these “pay-for-delay” 
settlements.1 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal 
Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc.,2 courts have applied a “rule of 
reason” analysis, but this analysis can be “complex and burdensome” 
and could allow anticompetitive deals to slip through.3 In the reverse 
payment context, the rule of reason—discussed more thoroughly in 
Part II(E) of this Note—places the burden on enforcers and plaintiffs 
to show that the generic “agreed to abstain from using the patented 
innovation” and that there is an “unexplained payment” from the 
branded drug company to the generic drug company.4 
California’s recently passed legislation (Assembly Bill 824 (AB 
824)), alternatively, shifts the burden to the settling companies to 
prove their arrangement is not anticompetitive.5 Although this 
 
 1. See Study, Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n 1 (Jan. 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-
how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/ 
100112payfordelayrpt.pdf [hereinafter Pay-for-Delay Study]; In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust 
Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 
136 (2013); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
abrogated by Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013). 
 2. 570 U.S. 136 (2013). 
 3. Id. at 144, 156; Robin Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 
2079, 2107, 2112 (1999). 
 4. Robin C. Feldman & Prianka Misra, The Fatal Attraction of Pay-for-Delay, 18 CHI.-KENT 
J. INTELL. PROP. 249, 259 (2019); Aaron Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST 16, 17–18 
(2013). 
 5. Assemb. B. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
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represents a leap forward for enforcers traditionally required to satisfy 
a rule of reason analysis, it still comes with its own challenges and 
questions. This Note will examine the state of play of reverse payment 
arrangements, analyze how the recent California legislation compares 
with common law and statutory antitrust provisions, and assess 
whether this legislation can effectively combat pay-for-delay 
settlements that extract large tolls from consumers. 
Part II will discuss the structure of pay-for-delay arrangements, 
the evolving state of the law related to pay-for-delay arrangements, 
and the role of antitrust agencies in policing pay-for-delay settlements. 
Part III will discuss the efficacy of AB 824, including potential 
pitfalls, constitutional challenges to the law, and how this legislation 
is situated within the overall proposals for pharmaceutical reform. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Structure of Pay-For-Delay Arrangements 
While the precise terms vary from settlement to settlement, the 
general structure of pay-for-delay arrangements is a quid pro quo 
between branded drug companies and generic drug companies.6 After 
the branded drug company files an infringement suit against the 
generic, it provides something of value—traditionally, a monetary 
settlement—to the generic drug company.7 However, this settlement 
appears less like a traditional litigation settlement and more like an 
agreement between competitors to restrain trade.8 The generic drug 
company agrees to delay the market entry of its competing product for 
a certain amount of time.9 The branded drug company thus remains 
able to charge consumers higher prices while the generic receives a 
portion of these monopoly profits. This arrangement allows both 
parties to benefit while externalizing the costs to consumers.10 
B.  Dueling Legislative Policy Goals Permitting Pay-For-Delay 
These reverse payment arrangements, and the toll they take on 
consumers, stem from competing policy goals and legislative 
 
 6. See Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 249. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. at 257. 
 9. Id. at 249. 
 10. See id. at 256. 
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frameworks. In hopes of incentivizing innovation, the United States 
currently allows twenty-year patent protection.11 Further, certain 
drugs have exclusivity periods that bar competitors from entering the 
market.12 These protections are in place to allow pharmaceutical 
companies to recover research and development costs.13 Limiting the 
market in this way, however, has the potential to create monopolies 
and price patients out of purchasing necessary drugs.14 
While maintaining these protections for patented drugs, Congress 
has also attempted to rein in drug costs. The Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Term Restoration Act—commonly known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act—promotes this goal by encouraging the entrance of 
lower-cost generic drugs that compete with the higher-priced branded 
drugs.15 This market entrance is facilitated by allowing the generic 
applicant to use the branded drug’s trials to demonstrate its own safety 
through the abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) process.16 
ANDA thus relieves generic companies of costly drug trials that 
represent a high barrier to entry. The first generic to file and obtain 
this approval gains a 180-day exclusivity period, creating a six-month 
 
 11. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018) (“[S]uch grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on 
which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent 
was filed in the United States . . . .”); Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-
drugs/frequently-asked-questions-patents-and-exclusivity#howlongpatentterm (last visited Oct. 4, 
2020). 
 12. Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, supra note 11. 
 13. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1562–63, 1562 n.25 (2006) (“For 
blockbuster drugs as with blockbuster films, the ability to legally exclude rivals from offering a 
copy preserves the return from a massive initial investment.”); Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 
254–55. 
 14. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Pharmaceutical Policy in the United States in 2019: An 
Overview of the Landscape and Avenues for Improvement, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 421, 453 
(2019) (“Once a drug is approved, the brand-name manufacturer sets its initial price in the United 
States at what the manufacturer estimates that the market will bear. . . . As a result, most brand-
name drugs cost far more in the United States than in other comparable settings around the world. 
Another distinct feature of the U.S. market is that manufacturers tend to increase prices over time 
prior to expiration of market exclusivity even in the absence of new information about the drug’s 
value.”). 
 15. Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 253; Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 13, at 
1565; see also Patent Drug Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. ch. 9). 
 16. Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 254; 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2018). 
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duopoly where only the generic and branded drugs compete.17 
Securing this approval and exclusivity is usually lucrative for generic 
manufacturers, potentially allowing revenues of several hundred 
million dollars.18 
A generic applying through ANDA and planning to compete with 
a branded drug must submit a certification, which includes a statement 
that the branded drug’s patent is “invalid or will not be infringed by 
the manufacture, use, or sale” of the generic.19 But filing this 
application constitutes an actionable infringement of the branded 
drug’s patent.20 The ostensible goal was to allow generics to resolve 
potential infringement claims and challenge weak patents, rather than 
be found to have infringed after the costly process of bringing the drug 
to market.21 This permits branded drug companies to sue their 
potential generic competitors and serves as the basis for pay-for-delay 
settlements. 
C.  Pay-For-Delay Benefits and Costs 
A challenge to the branded drug’s monopoly has the potential to 
cost its manufacturer billions of dollars.22 Though generics have had a 
73 percent success rate in cases where they have challenged branded 
drugs, there is always uncertainty in patent litigation, and a generic 
drug’s immediate rollout comes with costs to its manufacturer.23 A 
 
 17. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 255 (“[I]f the generic 
wins and the branded drug patents are invalidated, duopoly between the generic drug and the 
branded drug will begin immediately, potentially costing the brand manufacturer billions of 
dollars . . . .”). 
 18. Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 13, at 1579. 
 19. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV); see also Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 254; 
Hemphill, supra note 13, at 1565. 
 20. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2018); Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 13, at 1566. 
Such infringement, however, does not make the generic manufacturer liable for damages. See 
Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 254 (“While the expense and risk of litigation is a deterrent to 
the generic companies, they do not face liability for damages from sales of the product, if the patent 
is found valid given that they have not actually engaged in any sales.”). 
 21. Motion and Brief of Representative Henry A. Waxman as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 7, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2005) (No. 05-273), 
2005 WL 2462026, at *7. 
 22. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking 
to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 635 (2009) (“The two drug makers have 
a powerful incentive to settle. For a blockbuster drug with billions of dollars in annual sales, a 
brand-name firm has billions to lose from generic competition.”). 
 23. FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC 
STUDY vi (2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-
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settlement providing immediate benefits to generic manufacturers and 
extending the branded manufacturer’s monopoly creates substantial 
benefits for both parties.24 
This resolution is mutually beneficial to the parties—branded 
drug companies and generic drug manufacturers. However, it 
externalizes costs to third parties by burdening patients and insurance 
companies with unnecessarily extended monopoly prices. In 2009, 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Commissioner Jon Leibowitz 
calculated that “a conservative estimate of potential savings [for 
consumers] from a ban on pay for delay settlements” amounted to $3.5 
billion per year.25 Another study found that a one-year delay in the 
generic’s market entry represented a consumer cost of approximately 
$12 to $14 billion.26 This study also highlighted the welfare loss 
resulting from the changes to consumers’ and insurance companies’ 
purchasing decisions.27 
D.  Antitrust Laws and Agency Enforcement 
The traditional bases for federal antitrust enforcement are the 
Sherman Act of 1890, the Clayton Act of 1914, and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act of 1919 (“FTC Act”).28 “To establish liability under 
[section 1 of the Sherman Act], a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence 
of an agreement, and (2) that the agreement was in unreasonable 
restraint of trade.”29 Proving a Sherman Act section 2 monopolization 
violation requires showing: “(a) the possession of monopoly power in 
the relevant market; (b) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that 
power; and (c) causal ‘antitrust’ injury.”30 Section 7 of the Clayton 
 
prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf (“Generic applicants have prevailed in 
73 percent of the cases in which a court has resolved the patent dispute.”). 
 24. Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 13, at 1580–81. 
 25. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Speech at the Center for American 
Progress,  “Pay-for-Delay” Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress Can Stop 
Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers’ Wallets, and Help Pay for Health Care Reform (the 
$35 Billion Solution) 14 (June 23, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public
_statements/pay-delay-settlements-pharmaceutical-industry-how-congress-can-stop-
anticompetitive-conduct-protect/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf [hereinafter Leibowitz Speech]. 
 26. Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust, supra note 22, at 650. 
 27. Id. at 636. 
 28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018); id. §§ 12–27; id. §§ 41–58. 
 29. Aerotec Int’l, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 836 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 30. Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F.3d 991, 998 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (quoting Cal. Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 735 (9th 
Cir. 1979)). 
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Act prohibits acquisitions when “the effect of such acquisition may be 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”31 
The FTC Act empowers the FTC to bring antitrust law enforcement 
suits on its own authority.32 These laws create clear avenues to 
antitrust enforcement and empower agencies to sue. However, as 
discussed below, the difficulty in preventing these agreements lies in 
courts’ abilities to detect anticompetitive behavior and reticence to 
challenge the state-sanctioned monopoly created by the branded drug 
company’s patents.33 
Antitrust agencies have applied these laws and taken action at the 
federal and state levels. In recent years, the FTC has brought several 
pay-for-delay cases through federal court and administrative 
complaints.34 In these cases, the FTC has sought injunctions against 
similar future agreements and declarations that the companies have 
violated anti-monopolization laws within the FTC Act.35 Successful 
FTC cases produced orders stipulating that the generic and branded 
parties will refrain from entering into similar agreements without the 
consent of the FTC.36 At the state level, the California Department of 
Justice recently achieved settlements in cases related to three 
 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 32. Id. § 45(a). 
 33. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 141 (2013) (reviewing an 
11th Circuit decision that found a pay-for-delay settlement was “immune from antitrust attack so 
long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent” 
(quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 
570 U.S. 136 (2013))). 
 34. See Pay-for-Delay: When Drug Companies Agree Not to Compete, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/mergers-competition/pay-delay (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2020); see, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Allergan PLC, No. 17-cv-00312-WHO, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 66042 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2017); Impax Laboratories, Inc., In the Matter of, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/141-0004/impax-
laboratories-inc (last updated Aug. 2, 2019); Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and 
Equitable Monetary Relief at 1, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-02141-MSG 
(E.D. Pa. June 17, 2015) [hereinafter Cephalon, Inc. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction]. 
 35. See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 2, 26–27, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. Allergan PLC, No. 17-cv-00312-JCS  (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2017); 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) 
(“Whenever the Commission has reason to believe—(1) that any person, partnership, or corporation 
is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, 
and (2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a complaint by the Commission and until 
such complaint is dismissed by the Commission or set aside by the court on review, or until the 
order of the Commission made thereon has become final, would be in the interest of the public—
the Commission by any of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose may bring suit in a district 
court of the United States to enjoin any such act or practice.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Cephalon, Inc. Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction, supra note 34, at 9. 
 
(13) 54.1_WALLENTINE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/21  6:01 PM 
2020] ANALYZING EFFECTS OF CALIFORNIA’S AB 824 375 
pharmaceutical companies.37 These settlements enjoined the generic 
and branded parties from entering into similar arrangements and 
collected approximately $70 million in compensation for consumers.38 
E.  Federal Caselaw on Pay-For-Delay Settlements: Before and 
After Actavis 
 Early challenges to pay-for-delay arrangements found some 
success. In one such case, the Sixth Circuit found an arrangement 
where a branded company expressly paid a generic rival not to enter 
the market “a horizontal market allocation agreement and, as such . . . 
per se illegal under the Sherman Act and under the corresponding 
state antitrust laws.”39 
In this instance, however, the court noted that the facts were 
relatively straightforward.40 The “naked, horizontal restraint of trade,” 
presumed to reduce competition and harm consumers, led the court to 
find the settlement was per se illegal.41 
The mid-2000s, however, saw appellate courts failing to 
recognize the anticompetitive implications of pay-for-delay 
arrangements.42 In a case where the branded company agreed to pay a 
minimum of $60 million in licensing fees to a generic manufacturer to 
keep the generic drug from the market, the Eleventh Circuit held that 
there was no per se antitrust violation possible from this pay-for-delay 
settlement.43 While recognizing the “effect of agreements that employ 
extortion-type tactics to keep competitors from entering the market,” 
the court found that “[i]n the context of patent litigation . . . the 
anticompetitive effect may be no more broad than the patent’s own 
exclusionary power.”44 The Eleventh Circuit was also concerned that 
 
 37. Press Release, State of Cal. Dep’t of Just., Off. of the Att’y Gen., Attorney General Becerra 
Secures Nearly $70 Million Against Several Drug Companies for Delaying Competition and 
Increasing Drug Prices (July 29, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-
becerra-secures-nearly-70-million-against-several-drug [hereinafter Attorney General Becerra 
Press Release] (at the state level, the California Department of Justice recently achieved settlements 
in cases related to three pharmaceutical companies, Teva, Endo, and Teikoku). 
 38. Id. 
 39. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 40. Id. at 911. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Pay-for-Delay Study, supra note 1, at 1. 
 43. Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1060, 1065, 1076 (11th 
Cir. 2005). 
 44. Id. at 1064. 
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exposing “those agreements to antitrust liability would ‘obviously 
chill such settlements.’”45 
In the wake of this decision, other courts similarly subjected pay-
for-delay arrangements to lower levels of antitrust scrutiny.46 The 
Second Circuit “decline[d] to conclude . . . that reverse payments are 
per se violations of the Sherman Act . . . . [and] that the fact that the 
patent holder is paying to protect its patent monopoly, without more, 
establishes a Sherman Act violation.”47 The Federal Circuit similarly 
found that a district court was correct in not presuming a pay-for-delay 
arrangement to be per se unlawful, as “[o]nly agreements that have a 
‘predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect, and . . . limited 
potential for procompetitive benefit’ are deemed to be per se 
unlawful.”48 The court added that per se unlawfulness “is appropriate 
‘[o]nce experience with a particular type of restraint enables the Court 
to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it.’”49 
Courts during this era refused to see the clear anticompetitive effects 
of branded monopolies paying off potential competitors. As a result, 
during the six-year period from 2004 to 2009, pay-for-delay 
settlements increased from zero per year to nineteen per year.50 
Antitrust scrutiny increased with the Supreme Court’s 2013 
Actavis decision. In Actavis, the Court reviewed an Eleventh Circuit 
decision involving a pay-for-delay arrangement between generic 
manufacturers Actavis and Paddock and branded drug manufacturer 
Solvay.51 After Solvay acquired approval of a new branded drug in 
2000, and a patent for its drug in 2003, Actavis and Paddock filed 
ANDA certifications stating that Solvay’s patent was invalid and their 
generics did not infringe.52 Following the typical pay-for-delay 
 
 45. Id. (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 
2003)). 
 46. See Pay-for-Delay Study, supra note 1, at 1; see, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust 
Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 
136 (2013); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
abrogated by Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013). 
 47. In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 206. 
 48. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride, 544 F.3d at 1331–32 (alteration in original) (quoting 
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)). 
 49. Id. at 1332 (alterations in original) (quoting State Oil, 522 U.S. at 10). 
 50. Pay-for-Delay Study, supra note 1, at 1. 
 51. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 144–45. 
 52. Id. at 144. 
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pattern, Solvay sued Actavis and Paddock.53 Actavis’s generic ANDA 
application was approved and received first-to-file exclusivity.54 
However, the parties settled Solvay’s suit in 2006.55 The terms of this 
settlement required Actavis to “not bring its generic to market until 
August 31, 2015, 65 months before Solvay’s patent expired (unless 
someone else marketed a generic sooner).”56 The settlement also 
required Actavis to promote Solvay’s branded drug.57 The other 
generic drug parties agreed to similar obligations and delays.58 In 
return, Actavis received $19 million to $30 million annually for nine 
years from Solvay while the other generic companies received totals 
between $12 million and $60 million.59 
In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit found that pay-for-delay 
settlements were “immune from antitrust attack so long as its 
anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary 
potential of the patent.”60 Reversing this decision, the Supreme Court 
held that “reverse payment settlements such as the agreement alleged 
in the complaint before us can sometimes violate the antitrust laws.”61 
While allowing these actions to be brought, the Court did not find pay-
for-delay settlements per se illegal or raise the level of scrutiny beyond 
a rule of reason analysis.62 
A rule of reason analysis “requires a detailed and laborious 
inquiry which is described by courts and commentators as complex 
and burdensome on litigants and the judicial system.”63 In applying 
the rule of reason to pay-for-delay arrangements, some courts have 
followed a burden-shifting approach that requires plaintiffs to prove 
that the generic “agreed to abstain from using the patented innovation” 
and that there is an “unexplained payment” from the branded drug 
 
 53. Id. at 145. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 141 (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 
(11th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 570 U.S. 136 (2013)). 
 61. Id. (emphasis added). 
 62. Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 258. 
 63. Feldman, supra note 3, at 2107. 
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company to the generic drug company.64 Finding an unexplained 
payment requires: 
(a) valuing any consideration flowing from the patentee to 
the claimed infringer, which may be made over time and may 
take forms other than cash; (b) deducting from that payment 
the patent holder’s avoided litigation costs; and (c) deducting 
from that payment the value of goods, services, or other 
consideration provided by the claimed infringer to the patent 
holder as part of the same transaction (or linked 
transactions).65 
If these calculations result in a positive sum, it supports a finding of 
an unexplained payment that anticompetitively blocks the generic’s 
entry.66 
This calculation presents several challenges. First, difficult 
calculations—including the estimation of payments versus litigation 
costs—underpin the analysis.67 Parties seeking to maintain the 
benefits of that pay-for-delay system also have the incentive to 
complicate agreements to disguise the structure of payments.68 
Additionally, assertion of privileges hinders external investigation of 
the settlements.69 The rule of reason standard therefore presents a high 
hurdle for enforcers seeking to challenge these arrangements. 
F.  Current Pay-For-Delay Arrangements: Growing Complexity 
Despite the attention pay-for-delay settlements have gotten over 
the past decade and post-Actavis antitrust scrutiny, the total number of 
 
 64. Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 259; see also Edlin et al., supra note 4, at 17–18. 
 65. Edlin et al., supra note 4, at 18. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 260. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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settlements has continued to rise.70 During the 2015 fiscal year, 
branded and generic drug companies filed a total of 170 settlements.71 
Additionally, drug companies have used more complex 
arrangements to avoid detection and evade liability.72 The FTC’s own 
categorization of different pay-for-delay settlement forms has shifted 
completely over the past decade.73 In the most recent FTC reports from 
2013 to 2015, the FTC has included a category where the exchange 
between the branded and generic companies only presents possible 
compensation.74 
Outside of the FTC’s classification, Professor Robin Feldman and 
Research Fellow Prianka Misra identified their own “X category” that 
consists of arrangements where generic entry is delayed but no 
apparent value is exchanged.75 This category accounted for 74 percent 
of settlements in 2015.76 In examining where the value to generics 
might lie in such arrangements, Feldman and Misra analogize to the 
FTC’s recent recognition of the anticompetitive potential of declining 
royalty provisions in settlements.77 These provisions commit a generic 
to paying royalties unless the branded company launches its own 
generic.78 As with declining royalty provisions, there may be further 
complex elements within opaque settlements that provide value to the 
generics.79 
Beyond questions of immediate value to the parties, a potential 
anticompetitive threat in branded-generic settlements is the increased 
 
 70. See FED. TRADE COMM’N: BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND 
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003 1 (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agr
eements-filed-federal-trade-commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement-
modernization/overview_of_fy_2015_mma_agreements_0.pdf [hereinafter REPORT ON 
AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION] (“Consistent with FY 2014, the 
number of settlements potentially involving pay for delay continues to decrease significantly in the 
wake of the Actavis decision, even though the total number of settlements filed with the FTC has 
increased.”). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 252–53. 
 73. Id. at 262–63. 
 74. Id. at 263; REPORT ON AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
supra note 70. 
 75. Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 264. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 265–66. 
 78. Id. at 265. 
 79. Id. at 265–66. 
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prevalence of acceleration clauses, which allow the generic to hasten 
entry based on conditions like the entry of an authorized generic or 
another generic product.80 Such acceleration clauses were found in 
approximately 76 percent of settlements in a recent year.81 While 
greater generic entry typically encourages competition, acceleration 
clauses instead discourage other generics from entering the market due 
to the imminent entry of the generic that settled.82 
In addition, the rise of biologic and biosimilar drugs presents 
further challenges. Biologic drugs (such as Humira) are large, 
complex-molecule drugs that are typically composed of hundreds of 
atoms, in contrast to the small-molecule drugs (such as Nexium) that 
are composed of less than one hundred atoms.83 Biologic drugs have 
also been a key factor in rising drug costs.84 Biosimilar drugs, which 
act as a lower-cost alternative to the branded biologic drugs, account 
for a growing percentage of pharmaceutical industry revenue and 
expenses.85 Given the different regulations for biosimilars and the 
growth of this sector, there is the potential that an increasing portion 
of pay-for-delay settlements are going underreported as well.86 While 
enforcers have attacked the more traditional cash-for-delay 
settlements, clear challenges exist to discovering and policing new 
forms of quid pro quo arrangements that keep cheaper generics from 
the market. 
G.  Federal Pay-For-Delay Legislation Impasse 
Recognizing these complexities and that “[c]ompetition among 
drug makers is critical to lowering the price of prescription 
 
 80. Laura Karas et al., Pharmaceutical “Pay-for-Delay” Reexamined: A Dwindling Practice 
or a Persistent Problem?, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 959, 965 (2020). 
 81. Id. at 966. 
 82. Id. at 965–66; see also Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 
40–41 (2014). 
 83. See Small Molecules, Large Biologics and the Biosimilar Debate, ARIZ. BIOINDUST. 
ASS’N, https://www.azbio.org/small-molecules-large-biologics-and-the-biosimilar-debate (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
 84. Avik Roy, Biologic Medicines: The Biggest Driver of Rising Drug Prices, FORBES 
(Mar. 8, 2019, 8:20 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2019/03/08/biologic-
medicines-the-biggest-driver-of-rising-drug-prices/?sh=3eae873918b0 (“In 2017, according to 
data from the IQVIA Institute, biologic drugs represented 2 percent of all U.S. prescriptions, but 
37 percent of net drug spending. Since 2014, biologic drugs account for nearly all of the growth in 
net drug spending: 93 percent of it, in fact.”). 
 85. Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 266–73. 
 86. Id. at 272. 
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medications,” U.S. senators drafted legislation targeting pay-for-delay 
arrangements.87 In January 2017, Senators Amy Klobuchar and Chuck 
Grassley—members of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, 
Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights—introduced bill S.124, the 
Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act.88 The bill created a 
presumption that agreements in which generic ANDA filers receive 
“anything of value” are anticompetitive.89 The bill included an 
exception if “the procompetitive benefits of the agreement outweigh 
the anticompetitive effects of the agreement.”90 
After S.124 failed to move past a referral to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, a similar bill was introduced in December 2018 as 
S.3792—the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars 
Act.91 Apart from adding that biosimilars would be scrutinized along 
with ANDA generics, the bill largely remained the same.92 Since its 
introduction, no further action has been taken on this bill. 
Additionally, no other state has adopted specific pay-for-delay 
legislation, making California a bellwether for this issue.93 
H.  California State Legislation 
1.  Existing Antitrust Framework 
In addition to the federal antitrust law, California attorneys 
general have utilized state competition laws to target pay-for-delay 
schemes. In their complaint against Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, 
Cephalon, and Barr Laboratories, California Department of Justice 
attorneys alleged both “restraint of trade in violation of the Cartwright 
Act” and “violation of the Unfair Competition Law.”94 
 
 87. Samantha DiGrande, Klobuchar and Grassley Reintroduce Legislation to Address Pay-
For-Delay Tactics, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.centerforbiosimilars.co 
m/news/klobuchar-and-grassley-reintroduce-legislation-to-address-payfordelay-tactics. 
 88. S.124, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. S.3792, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Brenda Sandburg, California’s Pay-for-Delay Law May Be Harsher than FTC 
Regulation, Could Face Legal Challenge, PINK SHEET (Oct. 8, 2019), https://pink.pharmaintellig
ence.informa.com/PS140981/Californias-PayForDelay-Law-May-Be-Harsher-Than-FTC-
Regulation-Could-Face-Legal-Challenge. 
 94. Complaint at 24, 26, California v. Teva Pharm. Indus., Ltd., No. 2:19-cv-03281-MSG 
(E.D. Pa. July 29, 2019). 
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The Cartwright Act, California’s principal antitrust law, prohibits 
the “combination of capital, skill or acts” to “create or carry out 
restrictions in trade or commerce” and other forms of anticompetitive 
behavior.95 The Unfair Competition Law prohibits “unfair 
competition” including “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business 
act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading 
advertising.”96 To show that a business act is “unfair,” plaintiffs “must 
show the conduct ‘threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, 
or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects 
are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise 
significantly threatens or harms competition.’”97 
Both of these create private and public causes of action, and their 
existence is noted in the text of AB 824.98 However, the lack of an 
explicit definition for which acts are anticompetitive and implicate 
antitrust law creates the potential for anticompetitive behavior to slip 
by unchallenged. 
2.  AB 824 Legislative Process 
Currently, no state legislature has specifically targeted pay-for-
delay arrangements.99 In February 2019, State Assembly member Jim 
Wood introduced his Preserving Access to Affordable Drugs AB 824 
in partnership with Attorney General Xavier Becerra.100 On March 27, 
 
 95. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (Deering 2020). 
 96. Id. § 17200. 
 97. Byars v. SCME Mortg. Bankers, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 804–05 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(quoting Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 544 (Cal. 1999)). 
 98. Assemb. B. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (“The Cartwright Act makes every 
trust, subject to specified exemptions, unlawful, against public policy, and void and defines ‘trust’ 
for purposes of the act as a combination of capital, skill, or acts by 2 or more persons, defined as 
corporations, firms, partnerships, and associations, for certain designated purposes. Under existing 
law, these purposes include creating or carrying out restrictions in trade or commerce or preventing 
competition in manufacturing, marketing, transportation, sale, or purchase of merchandise, 
produce, or any commodity. The Unfair Practices Act makes certain business practices unlawful, 
including unfair competition. Under existing law, unfair competition is defined to include an 
unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice, unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading 
advertising, and any false representations to the public.”). 
 99. Melody Gutierrez, California Could Be First State to Bar Drug Makers from Paying 
Competitors to Delay Release, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2019, 4:10 PM), https://www.latimes.com/p
olitics/la-pol-ca-drug-companies-pay-for-delay-generic-phama-20190220-story.html. 
 100. See CAL. ASSEMB., HISTORY OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2019); Press Release, Assemblymember Jim Wood, Assemblymember Wood and Attorney General 
Becerra Announce Bill to Outlaw “Pay for Delay” Tactics of Drug Companies (Feb. 20, 2019), 
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2019, AB 824 was unanimously passed by the Assembly Health 
Committee.101 In the Assembly Judiciary Committee, the bill was 
passed after amendments that: 1) clarified “the penalty received by the 
State does not exceed the amount attributable to the violation based on 
California’s share of the market, or $20 million, whichever is greater,” 
and 2) “ensure[d] . . . the State does not receive penalties twice for the 
same infraction (i.e. through both the provisions of this bill and 
through other existing California antitrust laws).”102 During review by 
the Appropriations Committee, the bill was amended to modify the 
standard to require parties to prove they are not in violation by a 
“preponderance of the evidence” rather than “clear and convincing 
evidence.”103 The bill was then passed as amended by the 
Assembly.104 
The Senate Judiciary Committee made two major amendments. 
First, it created a statute of limitations—an action must be brought 
within four years of the cause of action accruing.105 Second, the 
Judiciary Committee added two additional carve-outs to section 
134002(d), which outlines settlements that are not prohibited by the 
bill.106 The first carve-out allows for “compensation for saved 
reasonable future litigation expenses of the reference drug holder” 
where the drugholder’s documented and adopted budgets reflect this 
 
https://a02.asmdc.org/press-releases/20190220-assemblymember-wood-and-attorney-general-
becerra-announce-bill-outlaw-pay [hereinafter Assemblymember Jim Wood Press Release]. 
 101. HISTORY OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824. 
 102. ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. 
Sess., at 6 (Cal. 2019) (as amended in Assembly, Apr. 9, 2019); Assemb. B. 824 (adding “up to . . . 
twenty million dollars . . . whichever is greater” and “[i]f the State of California is awarded penalties 
under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1), it may not recover penalties pursuant to another law 
identified in paragraph (2). This section shall not be construed to foreclose the State of California’s 
ability to claim any relief or damages available in paragraph (2), other than those that are 
penalties”). 
 103. Compare ASSEMB. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 
2019–2020 Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal. 2019) (“Specifically, under the bill these types of settlements in 
pharmaceutical patent infringement cases are presumed to be anticompetitive unless 
procompetitive effects can be clearly and convincingly demonstrated.”), with CAL. ASSEMB., 
ASSEMBLY THIRD READING OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess., at 1 (Cal. 2019)  
(replacing “clear and convincing” with “a preponderance of the” evidence). 
 104. See HISTORY OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824. 
 105. S. COMM. ON HEALTH, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess., at 
4 (Cal. 2019) (as amended in Senate, June 17, 2019); Assemb. B. 824 (“An action to enforce a 
cause of action for a violation of this section shall be commenced within four years after the cause 
of action accrued.”). 
 106. Assemb. B. 824. 
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compensation, and the compensation does not exceed $7.5 million or 
“five percent of the revenue that the nonreference drug holder 
projected or forecasted it would receive in the first three years of sales 
of its version of the reference drug documented at least 12 months 
before the settlement.”107 The second carve-out allows for 
An agreement resolving or settling a patent infringement 
claim that permits a nonreference drug filer to begin selling, 
offering for sale, or distributing the nonreference drug 
product if the reference drug holder seeks approval to launch, 
obtains approval to launch, or launches a different dosage, 
strength, or form of the reference drug having the same active 
ingredient before the date set by the agreement for entry of 
the nonreference drug filer.108 
The Senate further modified these 134002(d) carve-outs in its 
July 11, 2019 text.109 Rather than defining these carve-outs as 
exceptions to the general prohibition created by the bill, the July senate 
amendment listed these carve-outs as limitations on what the bill 
construed as “anything of value.”110 This July 11 amendment further 
clarified who may bring suit, stating that a violation penalty “is 
recoverable only in a civil action brought by the Attorney General” 
and that a penalty “shall accrue only to the State of California and shall 
be recovered in a civil action brought by the Attorney General.”111 The 
final Senate revision on September 4, 2019, modified what a party 
must show to succeed on its claim.112 Previously, a party was required 
to show that its agreement “directly generated procompetitive benefits 
that could not be achieved by less restrictive means” that “outweigh 
the anticompetitive effects of the agreement.”113 The “less restrictive 
means” language was removed, so a party is now only required to 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess., at 
6 (Cal. 2019) (as amended in Senate, July 11, 2019). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Assemb. B. 824; see S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, at 6. 
 112. S. RULES COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess., at 4–5 
(Cal. 2019) (as amended in Senate, Sept. 4, 2019). 
 113. S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, at 4 (as amended in Senate, 
July 11, 2019) (emphasis added). 
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show that the agreement “directly generated procompetitive benefits” 
that “outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the agreement.”114 
The bill was passed as amended in the senate on September 11, 
referred to the Assembly, and enrolled on September 24, 2019.115 The 
bill was approved by the governor on October 7, 2019, and chaptered 
in Chapter 531.116 
3.  Provisions of AB 824 
This legislation empowers the California Attorney General to 
bring a civil suit and recover penalties against “any party to an 
agreement that violates this section.”117 It further allows for the 
presumption of anticompetitive behavior when a “nonreference drug 
filer” (defined in the bill as an ANDA generic filer or biosimilar 
manufacturer) “receives anything of value from another company 
asserting patent infringement, including, but not limited to, an 
exclusive license or a promise that the brand company will not launch 
an authorized generic version of its brand drug” and “agrees to limit 
or forego research, development, manufacturing, marketing, or sales 
of the nonreference drug filer’s product for any period of time.”118 
Establishing the above creates a presumption of illegal 
anticompetitive behavior that parties may rebut by showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that either: “[t]he value received by the 
nonreference drug filer . . . is a fair and reasonable compensation 
solely for other goods or services that the nonreference drug filer has 
promised to provide” or that the “agreement has directly generated 
procompetitive benefits and the procompetitive benefits of the 
agreement outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the agreement.”119 
While “anything of value” is a broad term, the text carves out six 
settlement considerations that do not constitute something of value for 
 
 114. S. RULES COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, at 4 (as amended in Senate, 
Sept. 4, 2019). 
 115. CAL. ASSEMB., HISTORY OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 116. Id.; see Act of Oct. 7, 2019, ch. 531, 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West) (to be codified as CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 13400–134002). Subsequent references to the Act will be to CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE sections. 
 117. Act of Oct. 7, 2019 § 134002(e)(1)(B) (“Any penalty described in subparagraph (A) shall 
accrue only to the State of California and shall be recovered in a civil action brought by the Attorney 
General in its own name, or by any of its attorneys designated by it for that purpose, against any 
party to an agreement that violates this section.”). 
 118. Id. § 134002(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
 119. Id. § 134002(a)(3). 
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the purposes of the bill:120 First, “the right to market the competing 
product in the United States before the expiration of either: . . . [a] 
patent that is the basis for the patent infringement claim” or a “patent 
right or other statutory exclusivity that would prevent the marketing 
of the drug.”121 Second, “[a] covenant not to sue on a claim that the 
nonreference drug product infringes a United States patent.”122 Third, 
“[c]ompensation for saved reasonable future litigation expenses of the 
reference drug holder.”123 This compensation must be “reflected in 
budgets that the reference drug holder documented and adopted at 
least six months before the settlement” and be less than or equal to the 
lower of $7.5 million or “five percent of the revenue that the 
nonreference drug holder projected or forecasted it would receive in 
the first three years of sales of its version of the reference drug 
documented at least 12 months before the settlement.”124 Fourth, 
settlements that allow nonreference drug filers (generics and 
biosimilars) to sell or distribute their nonreference drugs when the 
reference drug holder (branded company) seeks approval for or 
launches a “different dosage, strength, or form of the reference drug 
having the same active ingredient before the date set by the agreement 
for entry of the nonreference drug filer.”125 The bill text, however, 
notes that authorized generic versions of the reference drug do not 
constitute a “different form” for the purpose of this subsection.126 
Fifth, a branded drug company’s agreements either to facilitate or to 
not interfere with the “nonreference drug filer’s ability to secure and 
maintain regulatory approval to market the nonreference drug 
product.”127 Finally, settlements in which the branded company 
“forgives the potential damages accrued by a nonreference drug holder 
for an at-risk launch of the nonreference drug product that is the 
subject of that claim.”128 
 
 120. Id. § 134002(a)(2)(A)–(F). 
 121. Id. § 134002(a)(2)(A). 
 122. Id. § 134002(a)(2)(B). 
 123. Id. § 134002(a)(2)(C). 
 124. Id. This subsection also notes that “[i]f no projections or forecasts are available, the 
compensation [must] not exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).” 
 125. Id. § 134002(a)(2)(D). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. § 134002(a)(2)(E). 
 128. Id. § 134002(a)(2)(F). 
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4.  Support and Opposition for AB 824 
Over the course of its development, key interest groups supported 
and opposed AB 824. Attorney General Xavier Becerra, at a time 
when the California Department of Justice emphasized its settlements 
against pay-for-delay arrangements, supported the bill.129 There was 
also general support for the bill among business associations, 
healthcare advocacy groups, and public interest organizations. 
Consumer Reports said that “AB 824 will make it easier to stop these 
[anticompetitive] schemes in their tracks.”130 Small Business Majority 
supported AB 824, noting that “[c]ontrolling prescription drug prices 
and ensuring competition, and thus controlling overall healthcare 
expenses, helps ensure small business owners have access to 
affordable, quality healthcare options.”131 California Health+ 
Advocates, a community health center advocacy group, supported AB 
824 as a policy that “reduces pharmaceutical costs for patients in 
California.”132 Health Access, a healthcare consumer advocacy group, 
said that AB 824 allowed California to prevent the “problematic, 
price-gouging practice of pay-for-delay by the prescription drug 
companies.”133 Other groups supporting the bill included AARP 
California, California Labor Federation, California Public Interest 
Research Group, Kaiser Permanente, and the Western Center on Law 
& Poverty, Inc.134 
The Association for Accessible Medicines, a trade association for 
generic drug manufacturers, opposed AB 824 because of concerns that 
it might penalize procompetitive settlements and its belief that Actavis 
represented a sufficient federal framework for antitrust scrutiny.135 
Other trade associations expressed similar fears and voiced 
conditional opposition. Biocom, a biotechnology trade association, 
 
 129. Attorney General Becerra Press Release, supra note 37. 
 130. ASSEMB. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 
Reg. Sess., at 14 (Cal. 2019) (hearing Apr. 9, 2019). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Press Release, Health Access, CA Consumers Could Save Millions Under Bills Up in 
Assembly Health Committee Tuesday (Mar. 25, 2019), https://health-access.org/press_release/ 
2019/03/ca-consumers-could-save-millions-under-bills-up-in-assembly-health-committee-
tuesday/. 
 134. ASSEMB. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, at 16 
(hearing Apr. 9, 2019). 
 135. Id. at 15–16. 
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was also concerned that the “bill usurps jurisdiction of finding and 
prosecuting of anti-competitive behavior from the [FTC] and inserts 
the State of California into this role.”136 Biocom further noted that two 
provisions—the initial presumption and private right of action—
would chill generic entry into the market.137 The pharmaceutical trade 
association Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
likewise sought amendments to: (1) “modify the scope to only include 
patent infringement claims”; (2) “allow the factfinder to make 
appropriate determinations based on the circumstances of the case”; 
and (3) remove the private right of action.138 These conditions were 
partially reflected in senate revisions of the bill, which eliminated the 
private right of action and lowered the requirements that parties must 
show.139 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Intent of AB 824 
The intent of AB 824 is fairly straightforward. From its title, the 
law’s purpose is to “preserv[e] access to affordable drugs” by 
prohibiting anticompetitive settlements that raise costs for patients.140 
In a public statement when the bill was introduced, Assembly member 
Wood said: 
Who loses [as a result of pay-for-delay arrangements]? The 
patients who deserve access to less expensive drugs and all 
of us who end up paying more for health care and, in turn, 
health care premiums. Affordability is a huge issue in health 
care, and this calculating practice makes it worse and we 
need to stop it.141 
 
 136. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. 
Sess., at 13 (Cal. 2019) (hearing July 9, 2019). 
 137. Id. 
 138. CAL. ASSEMB., ASSEMBLY THIRD READING OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 
Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal. 2019) (as amended May 16, 2019). 
 139. S. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. 
Sess., at 1 (Cal. 2019) (as amended in Senate, July 11, 2019); S. RULES COMM., ANALYSIS OF 
ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 824, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess., at 2–6 (Cal. 2019) (as amended in Senate, Sept. 4, 
2019). 
 140. Act of Oct. 7, 2019, ch. 531, 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West) (to be codified as CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE §§ 13400–134002). 
 141. Assemblymember Jim Wood Press Release, supra note 100. 
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Attorney General Becerra added that “[t]his legislation 
is a crucial step in combating predatory pricing practices, like ‘pay-
for-delay’ schemes, by drug companies and in defending access to 
affordable care.”142 
B.  Efficacy of AB 824 
The intent of the legislation is relatively clear. The larger question 
is whether AB 824 can achieve its goals of lowering pharmaceutical 
costs and preserving affordable drugs for patients. This efficacy 
analysis requires examining: (1) the expansion and limitations placed 
on antitrust enforcement by the law’s text and amendments; (2) the 
ability of the law to prohibit the variety of anticompetitive settlements; 
(3) whether the law might survive a nascent challenge; and (4) whether 
AB 824 is an effective mechanism for addressing high drug costs for 
patients. 
1.  Expansion and Limits of Antitrust Enforcement Created by AB 
824 
The main expansion of AB 824 is clear. It shifts the burden from 
enforcers to the branded and generic companies, requiring them to 
prove that their settlement is not anticompetitive. Practically, this 
lowers the barrier to what the Attorney General must prove to obtain 
penalties against such anticompetitive behavior. Rather than requiring 
the Attorney General to build large cases showing collusion between 
companies, the burden now falls on branded and generic drug 
companies to show that their behavior is not harmful. Furthermore, 
AB 824 makes it more difficult for judges to approve pay-for-delay 
arrangements. As antitrust practitioners have noted, some judges have 
been “erod[ing]” enforcement of federal antitrust laws since the 
1970s.143 While judges may still rule in favor of an anticompetitive 
pay-for-delay arrangement, this legislation creates additional hurdles. 
However, this law is not a blunt prohibition on all settlements 
between branded and generic drug manufacturers. It places key 
limitations on actions against these parties. Only the California 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. John Newman, What Democratic Contenders Are Missing in the Race to Revive Antitrust, 
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/what-2020-
democratic-candidates-miss-about-antitrust/586135/. 
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Attorney General—not private parties or the United States Department 
of Justice or FTC—may seek remedies under this law.144 Additionally, 
although it shifts the burden, it allows for numerous exceptions. It 
limits “anything of value” to exclude certain scenarios involving 
agreements related to: the right to market, covenants to not sue, 
compensation for branded company’s future litigation expenses, the 
branded company’s new form or dosage of the reference drug, 
regulatory approval for the generic drug, and forgiveness of potential 
damages.145 
The bill also allows companies to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the settlement either offers procompetitive benefits 
that outweigh the anticompetitive harms or is “fair and reasonable 
compensation solely for other goods or services that the nonreference 
drug filer has promised to provide.”146 While branded and generic 
drug companies were concerned that it would prevent procompetitive 
settlements, the exceptions to “anything of value” and ways to 
disprove liability show that this legislation is not overly broad. 
2.  AB 824’s Ability to Capture Increasingly Complex Pay-For-
Delay Settlements 
While not being overly broad, AB 824 raises the question of 
whether—with all of its carveouts—it can still prohibit the intended 
anticompetitive pay-for-delay schemes. While the FTC in 2016 
celebrated a decline in traditional compensation pay-for-delay 
arrangements post-Actavis, they have also reported settlements where 
the arrangements present potential compensation.147 Beyond the 
FTC’s detection of such potential pay-for-delay settlements, scholars 
 
 144. Act of Oct. 7, 2019 § 134002(e)(1)(B) (“Any penalty described in subparagraph (A) shall 
accrue only to the State of California and shall be recovered in a civil action brought by the Attorney 
General in its own name, or by any of its attorneys designated by it for that purpose, against any 
party to an agreement that violates this section.”). 
 145. Id. § 134002(a)(2). 
 146. Id. § 134002(a)(3)(A). 
 147. Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 249, 261–62 (“FTC reports and commentary suggest 
that the agency may have ‘finally started to turn the corner on the issue.’ In a [2016] FTC blog, for 
example, the FTC concluded that although more settlements between brand-name companies and 
generics occurred than in any previous year, pharmaceutical companies managed to settle without 
“any compensation” to the generic company 80 percent of the time.”); Jamie Towey & Brad Albert, 
Is FTC v. Actavis Causing Pharma Companies to Change Their Behavior?, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N (Jan. 13, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-
matters/2016/01/ftc-v-actavis-causing-pharma-companies-change-their. 
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have also noted that 74 percent of settlements between branded and 
generic parties in 2015 delayed generic entry but exchanged no 
discernible value.148 This raises the specter that branded and generic 
drug companies are simply creating more complex pay-for-delay 
arrangements. 
AB 824 only prohibits the exchange of “anything of value” and 
excludes several considerations from being considered something of 
value.149 Some of these exclusions, including considerations of 
noninterference with regulatory approval and the branded drug 
company’s forgiveness of potential damages, which were added in the 
senate following drug company requests, could provide vehicles for 
key exchanges that are now deemed not of value.150 
The focus on the exchange itself rather than the resulting 
restrictions on entry is understandable given courts’ concern about 
whether these settlements represent parties’ fair estimations of patent 
value or a monopolistic toll. However, as scholars surveying the pay-
for-delay landscape have suggested, this analysis does not account for 
settlement items such as acceleration clauses that still present 
anticompetitive harms.151 Some scholars have suggested that a better 
framework would be to examine the “existence of a restriction on 
generic entry . . . in light of the strength of the category of patent in 
question.”152 Using a different methodology, Professor Michael 
Carrier offered a test that analyzes “whether the brand has conveyed 
to the generic a type of consideration not available as a direct 
consequence of winning the lawsuit.”153 These restriction-based and 
consideration-based approaches cast a wider net for anticompetitive 
arrangements while preserving parties’ ability to settle. AB 824’s 
focus on payments, instead, may prove insufficient to capture the 
different harms to competition posed by these settlements. 
These limitations lessen the legislation’s efficacy in scrutinizing 
an industry that has already made adjustments to their quid pro quo 
arrangements. Furthermore, given the decade it took to pass any pay-
for-delay legislation, it is unlikely that legislators would pass new bills 
adapting to new forms of pay-for-delay arrangements. The danger of 
 
 148. Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 264. 
 149. Act of Oct. 7, 2019 § 134002(a)(1)–(2). 
 150. Id. § 134002(a)(2).  
 151. Karas et al., supra note 80, at 965; Carrier, supra note 82, at 40–41. 
 152. Karas et al., supra note 80, at 968. 
 153. Carrier, supra note 82, at 26. 
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pay-for-delay mutations means that this more static legislation could 
calcify into only creating liability for traditional pay-for-delay models 
that most branded and generic companies would avoid. 
Although loopholes remain an issue, AB 824 still has the potential 
to limit pay-for-delay costs on consumers. The burden shift to 
companies from a more lenient rule of reason standard is a significant 
step forward. While Actavis reopened the door for antitrust scrutiny, 
agencies still need to satisfy a rule of reason analysis that is “complex 
and burdensome on litigants and the judicial system.”154 AB 824 
instead simply requires antitrust enforcers to show the exchange of 
something of value between branded drug companies and generic 
manufacturers and the delayed entry of the generic drug. This relieves 
agencies of expending significant resources on what should be 
straightforward cases and allows for a cleaner analysis for courts that 
misunderstand anticompetitive harms. 
In addition, the pharmaceutical industry’s challenge of the bill 
suggests that it has a role to play in prohibiting pay-for-delay 
agreements. Following the passage of AB 824, the general counsel for 
Association for Accessible Medicines (AAM), a generic drug trade 
association, said that “most settlements have a provision that would 
trigger anticompetitive presumption” and referenced an “acceleration 
clause whereby if another generic manufacturer launches its product, 
the party to the settlement can market its generic at the same time.”155 
Despite the fact that AB 824 allows companies to dispute the 
presumption, AAM worried that this would “trigger the ‘anything of 
value’ provision” and create an anticompetitive presumption.156 The 
industry’s concern about the legislation’s potential application to 
many settlements suggests that it may be effective in discouraging 
anticompetitive pay-for-delay arrangements. 
Finally, this legislation allows for scrutiny of generic versions of 
small-molecule branded drugs and large-molecule biologic drugs. 
Biologic drugs and their biosimilar generic versions represent a 
growing percentage of the pharmaceutical industry.157 This 
legislation’s decision to use “nonreference drug filer,” “nonreference 
drug product,” “reference drug holder,” and “reference drug product” 
 
 154. Feldman, supra note 3, at 2107. 
 155. Sandburg, supra note 93. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Feldman & Misra, supra note 4, at 266–67. 
(13) 54.1_WALLENTINE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/21  6:01 PM 
2020] ANALYZING EFFECTS OF CALIFORNIA’S AB 824 393 
rather than the simpler “generic” and “brand” distinction reflects the 
same recognition that the federal Preserve Access to Affordable 
Generics and Biosimilars Act made—biosimilars and biologics are 
subject to the same incentives as ANDA and branded small molecule 
drugs.158 This inclusion allows the Attorney General to police this 
growing marketplace in the same fashion as the traditional small 
molecule market. 
3.  Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge 
In November 2019, the AAM filed suit in the Eastern District of 
California against Attorney General Becerra to block enforcement of 
this legislation.159 It primarily alleges federal constitutional claims: a 
dormant commerce clause claim, a preemption claim, and an 
excessive fine Eighth Amendment claim.160 Examining AAM’s claim 
is useful in both understanding challenges to this specific legislation 
and for highlighting potential tension between state antitrust 
legislation and federalist principles. 
In its dormant commerce clause claim, AAM alleges that the 
legislation violates the clause because it contains no geographic 
limitations on the patent settlements to which it applies.161 Citing 
Healy v. Beer Institute,162 AAM suggests that when a state law in 
effect regulates “commerce occurring wholly outside [the] State’s 
borders,” it will be “struck down under the Commerce Clause 
‘whether or not the regulated commerce has effects within the 
state.’”163 While noting that “AB 824 does not expressly refer to out-
of-state commerce,” AAM states that the Supreme Court has held that 
the fact that state legislation “is addressed only to” conduct “in [the 
 
 158. Act of Oct. 7, 2019, ch. 531, § 134000, 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West); S.3792, 115th Cong. 
(2018). 
 159. See Complaint at 1, Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Becerra, No. 2:19-cv-02281-TLN-DB 
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2019) [hereinafter AAM Complaint]. 
 160. Id. at 30–46. 
 161. Id. at 31–32 (“AB 824 extends to commerce (namely, patent settlements) negotiated, 
signed, and entered wholly outside the borders of California. AB 824 contains no restrictions that 
would limit its application to settlement agreements between California entities, and no restrictions 
that would limit its application to settlement agreements that were negotiated, completed, or entered 
in California.”). 
 162. 491 U.S. 324 (1989). 
 163. See AAM Complaint, supra note 159, at 31 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Healy, 491 U.S. at 335–36). 
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state] is irrelevant if the ‘practical effect’” is to regulate conduct “in 
other States.”164 
However, dormant commerce clause based reviews of state 
legislation affecting external transactions have been more lenient than 
AAM’s discussion suggests. Dormant commerce clause reviews of 
state statutes frequently apply the flexible Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc.165 balancing test that states, “[w]here the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects 
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the 
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to 
the putative local benefits.”166 Other courts have formulated the test as 
requiring the examination of: 
(1) whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly 
with only “incidental” effects on interstate commerce, or 
discriminates against interstate commerce either on its face 
or in practical effect; 
(2) whether the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and, 
if so, 
(3) whether alternative means could promote this local 
purpose as well without discriminating against interstate 
commerce.167  
A key element of the Pike test is the “evenhandedness” with 
which the statute regulates. Some courts have held that if a statute 
affects both in-state and out-of-state transactions relatively equally, 
the dormant commerce clause is likely not implicated, and it is 
unnecessary to even apply the Pike test.168 In the case of AB 824, there 
is no disparity between the legislation’s treatment of in-state and out-
of-state actors. The legislation’s text does not single out California 
pharmaceutical firms or out-of-state pharmaceutical firms in terms of 
 
 164. Id. at 32 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers 
Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)). 
 165. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
 166. Id. at 142. 
 167. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 142). 
 168. Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2014), 
aff’d, 794 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[W]here, as here, there is no discrimination and there is no 
significant burden on interstate commerce, we need not examine the actual or putative benefits of 
the challenged statutes.” (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 
1144, 1155 (2012))). 
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enforcement.169 Nor does it include exceptions that only apply to in-
state firms.170 While enforcement actions may reveal the legislation’s 
disparate impact on in-state and out-of-state firms, at present the 
statute appears to apply evenhandedly towards both designations. 
Even applying the Pike test, it still provides a fairly lenient 
standard. A court must find that “the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.”171 The Ninth Circuit has taken this to mean that “[f]or a 
facially neutral statute to violate the commerce clause, the burdens of 
the statute must so outweigh the putative benefits as to make the 
statute unreasonable or irrational.”172 “Such is the case,” the court 
noted, “where the asserted benefits of the statute are in fact illusory or 
relate to goals that evidence an impermissible favoritism of in-state 
industry over out-of-state industry.”173 In examining a city ordinance 
that required contractors to provide benefits to employees with 
registered domestic partners, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[w]hile we 
do not require a dollar estimate of the effect the Ordinance will have, 
we do require specific details as to how the costs of the Ordinance 
burdened interstate commerce.”174 It further clarified that “[t]he 
Commerce Clause is concerned with the free flow of goods and 
services through the several states; it is the economic interest in being 
free from trade barriers that the clause protects.”175 This suggests that 
the Ninth Circuit believes the primary function of the dormant 
commerce clause to be preventing state-against-state protectionism 
and trade barriers, not to necessarily prohibit states from regulating all 
transactions that have an effect on their citizens but involve some out-
of-state elements. 
AAM alternately suggests a broader dormant commerce clause 
basis for striking down state laws that affect out-of-state firms. It cites 
Healy as holding that the Court will strike down state laws regulating 
“commerce occurring wholly outside [the] State’s borders,” regardless 
 
 169. See Act of Oct. 7, 2019, ch. 531, 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West) (omitting explicit 
references to California-based firms or externally-based firms). 
 170. See id. (omitting language that restricts application to California firms exclusively). 
 171. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 
443 (1960)). 
 172. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. City of Long Beach, 951 F.2d 977, 983 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 173. Id. 
 174. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 253 F.3d 461, 471 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 175. Id. 
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of whether the regulated commerce has in-state effects.176 AAM also 
cites Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor 
Authority177 as holding that legislation’s direction at intrastate 
commerce is irrelevant if the “practical effect” of the legislation is to 
regulate external commerce.178 
However, other courts have found Healy and Brown-Forman 
Distillers to be narrower than AAM’s hoped-for rule. The Tenth 
Circuit noted that in these cases, “the Court . . . faced (1) a price 
control or price affirmation regulation, (2) linking in-state prices to 
those charged elsewhere, with (3) the effect of raising costs for out-of-
state consumers or rival businesses.”179 The Court itself appears to 
emphasize the central dormant commerce clause rule in Healy: “States 
may not deprive businesses and consumers in other States of 
‘whatever competitive advantages they may possess’ based on the 
conditions of the local market.”180 
In sum, the principal purpose of the dormant commerce clause 
appears to be preventing protectionism between the states; review of 
a potential dormant commerce clause frequently involves the fairly 
lenient Pike balancing test that favors upholding state laws; and 
courts’ analyses tend to focus on whether states are erecting trade 
barriers to favor their own industries. While the Pike test does allow 
for court discretion in balancing the factors, the lack of protectionist 
tendencies in this legislation suggests it is unlikely to implicate the 
dormant commerce clause. 
4.  Preemption Challenge 
In its preemption claim, AAM argues that the barriers to 
settlement imposed by AB 824 undermine “not only the rights that 
federal patent law confers, but also the timely entry of lower-priced 
generic medicines onto the market.”181 Generally, the Supreme Court 
has found conflict preemption occurs “where ‘compliance with both 
state and federal law is impossible,’ or where ‘the state law “stands as 
 
 176. AAM Complaint, supra note 159, at 31 (alteration in original) (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 
492 U.S. 324, 332 (1989)). 
 177. 476 U.S. 573 (1986). 
 178. AAM Complaint, supra note 159, at 31 (quoting Healy, 492 U.S. at 336). 
 179. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 180. Healy, 492 U.S. at 339 (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers, 476 U.S. at 580). 
 181. AAM Complaint, supra note 159, at 41. 
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an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress.”’”182 A cursory look might thus suggest 
this legislation would be preempted. This legislation attempts to curb 
the pay-for-delay results of the Hatch-Waxman’s ANDA process. It 
interacts with patents that branded drug companies own. And scholars 
have suggested that similar state patent legislation—statutes that 
prohibit patent trolling—may indeed be preempted.183 Upon closer 
inspection, however, AB 824 does not impede the underlying goals of 
patent laws or the Hatch-Waxman Act.184 
In Wyeth v. Levine,185 the Court outlined the “two cornerstones of 
our pre-emption jurisprudence.”186 “First, ‘the purpose of Congress is 
the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.’”187 “Second, ‘[i]n 
all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has 
“legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally 
occupied,” . . . we “start with the assumption that the historic 
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal 
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”’”188 
The congressional purpose underlying the Hatch-Waxman Act 
was to “make available more low cost generic drugs by establishing a 
generic drug approval procedure for pioneer drugs first approved after 
1962.”189 Representative Henry Waxman, one of its drafters, 
described it as “an early attempt to address the problem of prescription 
drug prices by encouraging competition against brand-name drugs 
from generic drug manufacturers.”190 Its ANDA process is merely a 
means to the ends, not the ends in itself. In an amicus brief clarifying 
the policy behind Hatch-Waxman, Representative Waxman 
 
 182. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 377 (2015) (quoting California v. ARC Am. 
Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1989)). 
 183. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1583 (2015). 
 184. This analysis was aided by the amicus brief filed by Professor Michael Carrier in the case’s 
Ninth Circuit appeal. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee’s Answering Brief, 
Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Becerra, No. 20-15014, 2020 WL 4251776 (9th Cir. July 24, 2020) 
[hereinafter Professor Michael Carrier Amicus Curiae Brief]. 
 185. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 186. Id. at 565. 
 187. Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). 
 188. Id. (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485). 
 189. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647. 
 190. Motion and Brief of Representative Henry A. Waxman as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 3, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273), 
2005 WL 2462026, at *3. 
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commented that “[a]greeing with smaller rivals to delay or limit 
competition is an abuse of the Hatch-Waxman law that was intended 
to promote genetic alternatives.”191 He further noted that, “[b]y 
subjecting [pay-for-delay settlements] to stringent governmental 
scrutiny and providing an additional penalty if they were found to 
violate the antitrust laws, the 2003 [Medicare Drug Benefit 
Legislation] underscored that the Hatch-Waxman Act was never 
intended to foster such anti-competitive arrangements.”192 
Like the Hatch-Waxman Act’s goal of ensuring low-cost generic 
availability, AB 824 aims to make necessary drugs affordable to 
California patients. In method, it similarly leverages market 
competition to drive down drug prices. As AB 824 does not diverge 
from the objectives laid out by Hatch-Waxman’s drafters and instead 
attempts to ameliorate the anticompetitive side effects of the ANDA 
process, its purpose mirrors Congress’s purpose. Given the primacy of 
congressional intent in preemption analysis, it is therefore not likely 
to be preempted by the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
In examining the potential preemption of AB 824 by federal 
patent law, Professor Michael Carrier emphasizes that the Court has 
rejected the “absolutist” approach that prohibits antitrust scrutiny of 
patent disputes.193 In Actavis, the Court noted that a patent’s 
exclusionary potential does not “immunize the agreement from 
antitrust attack.”194 Looking at precedent, the Court found that 
“patent-related settlement agreements can sometimes violate the 
antitrust laws.”195 The Court also noted the variety of outcomes in 
patent disputes—patent holders are only permitted to enforce their 
monopoly when their patent is found to be valid and infringed.196 
Instead of following the Eleventh Circuit’s immunization of 
companies based on one party’s assertion that its patent was valid and 
infringed, the Court found that “a court, by examining the size of the 
payment, may well be able to assess its likely anticompetitive effects 
along with its potential justifications without litigating the validity of 
the patent; and parties may well find ways to settle patent disputes 
 
 191. Id. at *7. 
 192. Id. at *10. 
 193. Professor Michael Carrier Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 184, at 15. 
 194. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 147 (2013). 
 195. Id. at 149. 
 196. Id. at 147. 
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without the use of reverse payments.”197 Accordingly, the Court 
opposed determining “antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s 
anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy, rather than by 
measuring them against procompetitive antitrust policies as well.”198 
By ensuring that judges take into account antitrust concerns rather than 
rubberstamping patent settlements as was done pre-Actavis, AB 824 
codifies the Actavis recognition that antitrust scrutiny can coexist with 
patent protections. 
Returning to the legislative intent underlying patent law, courts 
have noted that “the fundamental purpose of patent law is to 
promote innovation and the disclosure of inventions so that ultimately 
new discoveries may benefit the public at large.”199 AB 824 does not 
interfere with this goal of promoting innovation. Its language includes 
numerous carveouts to ensure that competitive settlements are not 
unfairly affected while ensuring that settlements that would harm the 
public are subject to scrutiny. Because this legislation does not depart 
from patent law’s innovation intent and because the Supreme Court 
has explicitly recognized the necessity of antitrust scrutiny coexisting 
with patent settlements, AB 824 does not appear to be preempted by 
federal patent law. 
5.  AB 824’s Role in Lowering Drug Prices—Survey of 
Complementary Solutions 
Finally, in assessing whether this legislation will impact high 
drug pricing, it is important to examine the overall pharmaceutical 
landscape. Some calculations have suggested that savings from a ban 
on pay-for-delay arrangements could save consumers approximately 
$3.5 billion per year.200 Others have found “a transfer from consumers 
to producers” of approximately $12 to $14 billion per year’s delay of 
generic entry.201 The total U.S. expenditure on pharmaceuticals for 
2016, however, was estimated to be approximately $480 billion.202 Of 
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this $480 billion, $323 billion (two-thirds of the total amount) went to 
drug manufacturers, while the other third went to the supply chain.203 
AB 824 targets a key portion of these expenditures—the drug 
manufacturers—by preventing anticompetitive agreements between 
them. There are still potential inefficiencies from both the 
manufacturers and supply chain sectors that other policies could 
reduce or eliminate. 
Some state legislatures have introduced bills that more directly 
set limits on drug pricing.204 Some of these bills, such as Maryland’s, 
impose a burden on drug manufacturers to explain certain price 
increases—Maryland suggests a 50 percent increase figure as a 
potential violation in the bill’s text—or pay a fine.205 Others, like New 
York’s, require drug manufacturers to reimburse the state if their drug 
prices exceed price targets set by the Department of Health.206 These 
bills benefit from directly setting limits and controls on prices. 
However, some have noted that their scope remains limited—
Maryland’s law solely deals with generic drugs while New York’s is 
limited to Medicaid payments.207 Other state pricing bills have taken 
a more comprehensive approach, but these bills have not progressed 
past committee.208 
Other methods to bring down costs have also been proposed. 
Some have suggested implementing final-offer arbitration between 
drug manufacturers and drug purchasers (such as pharmacy benefit 
managers) to force a more reasonable solution for drug pricing 
disputes.209 Others have proposed modeling or modifying price 
gouging laws meant to curb gouging in times of crisis to include 
pharmaceutical products.210 More dramatic approaches—such as 
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nationalizing the pharmaceutical industry through the creation of a 
medicines agency—have also been proposed.211 
Given the multitude of factors that drive drug prices, some states 
have also introduced bills requiring drug manufacturers to publicly 
report major cost data.212 These bills would allow the public to more 
easily understand when drug manufacturers are engaging in price 
gouging by revealing different factors such as costs associated with 
research and development, manufacturing, marketing, advertising, 
and regulatory approval.213 Supported by this information, the public 
could then demand further action by regulators, legislators, and the 
companies to lower exorbitant prices.214 Not all of the state bills, 
however, require comprehensive disclosure of the different factors, 
and not all bills apply to every marketed drug.215 These limitations 
could prevent the public and legislators from becoming fully 
informed, which might hinder the push for further drug price reform. 
In addition, this puts the burden on the public to constantly monitor 
and push for further legislative or regulatory action, rather than 
legislators simply imposing price caps. 
At an agency level, federal antitrust enforcers could undertake 
further actions against anticompetitive scenarios in various sectors of 
the pharmaceutical industry. For instance, in addition to collusive 
agreements between drug manufacturers themselves, there is intense 
concentration in the principal agents for pharmaceutical purchasers. 
One report estimated that within the pharmaceutical benefit manager 
sector, 70–75 percent of all prescription claims are handled by the top 
three companies.216 In the pharmaceutical wholesaler industry, the top 
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three wholesalers receive 85–90 percent of drug distribution revenues, 
with the top two wholesalers together receiving over 60 percent of 
revenues.217 If antitrust agencies are interested in spurring different 
firms to compete on pricing, bringing actions to decrease the 
concentration of different sectors within the pharmaceutical market 
could be beneficial. This could run into judicial hurdles, but it presents 
a further opportunity to leverage the antitrust laws in favor of lowering 
drug costs.218 
Assuming no nationalization or national price caps, each solution 
by itself is insufficiently comprehensive to bring about reasonable 
drug prices. However, all offer a partial fix. AB 824 thus might 
represent one part of a larger tapestry of price-decreasing solutions. 
Although it remains a limited solution, AB 824 targets a clear 
inefficiency within the system—agreements that prevent price-
lowering competition between drug manufacturers—and attempts to 
eliminate that efficiency. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Scholars have recognized the toll pay-for-delay arrangements 
take on consumers for the last fifteen years.219 Despite the 
understanding of this problem, the rule of reason approach taken by 
federal courts still places a heavy burden on enforcers. Federal 
legislation to shift the burden to companies has stalled, and no other 
states have passed legislation on this issue. 
Given the need for agencies to address these issues, California’s 
recent law presents a step forward. While stopping short of per se 
illegality, shifting the burden to drug manufacturers will make it easier 
to prevent anticompetitive pay-for-delays arrangements. The 
legislation’s focus on value and numerous exceptions may undermine 
its ability to capture increasingly complex pay-for-delay 
manifestations in which an exchange of value is difficult to detect. 
However, its application to every transaction where there is an 
exchange of value is a significant improvement to the prior rule of 
reason analysis. 
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While this legislation represents only one piece of the solution to 
high drug prices, there is no panacea for drug pricing problems short 
of a comprehensive, widely applied cap on drug prices. Accordingly, 
California’s pay-for-delay legislation could work in tandem with other 
policy proposals—such as certain price caps, greater transparency 
requirements, negotiations—to target the inefficiencies in the 
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